Trouble in Trademark Law: How Applying Different Theories Leaves Door Open for Abuse by Nichols, Connie Davis
Science and Technology Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 1 Article 2
2014
Trouble in Trademark Law: How Applying
Different Theories Leaves Door Open for Abuse
Connie Davis Nichols
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Science and
Technology Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Connie Davis Nichols, Trouble in Trademark Law: How Applying Different Theories Leaves Door Open for Abuse, 17 SMU Sci. & Tech.
L. Rev. 1 (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech/vol17/iss1/2
Trouble in Trademark Law: How Applying





I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ I
II. TRADEMARK'S ROLE IN THE FREE
M ARKETPLACE ........................................ 6
III. CONFLICTING THEORIES OF TRADEMARK LAW.. 7
A. Source Theory: Prevention of Consumer Confusion
and Competitor Counterfeit .......................... 8
1. Distinctiveness: The Basis of a Trademark's
Ability to Distinguish ............................ 12
2. Burdens Associated With Distinction ............. 16
3. Shifting Distinction ............................... 16
4. G enericide ....................................... 18
B. Quality Theory: Protection of Business Goodwill..... 20
1. Trademark as Symbolic of Owner's Goodwill .... 20
2. Dilution: Remedial Expansion in Trademark
L aw ................................ ............. 23
3. Frustrations of Dilution (Goodwill Protection) .... 24
4. Internet and Initial Interest Confusion ........... 25
5. The Reality of the Internet Troika ............... 26
IV. TRADEMARK POLICING VS. TRADEMARK
BU LLY IN G .............................................. 27
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... 29
I. INTRODUCTION
Never in a million years would one suspect that a small, virtually un-
known, Internet start-up company would threaten George Lucas-the master
of all things in a galaxy far, far away. It stunned Matt Cooper, owner of
Addroid,' when he received a cease-and-desist letter from LucasFilms Ltd./
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1. In September 2010, Cooper's web-based advertising platform "Addroid" was
in the pre-launch phase when the topic for this article was conceived. As of
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Lucas Entertainment.2 The letter alleged Cooper's use of the word "droid" in
his business name infringed upon Lucas' established trademark rights in the
registered "DROID" trademark. Cooper, intending to launch his start-up in
January 2011, had two options: either cease all use of the term "Addroid"
and any other mark that included the use of "droid" or battle with Lucas, not
in the throes of space, but in a courtroom. 3 In September 2013, Forbes esti-
mated George Lucas's net worth to be $4.2 billion.4 That figure positions the
film director and special effects guru with the ability to follow through on his
threat against Cooper and any other infringement potentially threatening his
establishment as the premier owner and user of all things "droid."
To many observers and trademark advocates, Lucas's actions appear to
be logical outgrowths of the desire to protect his trademark. Indeed, the law
imposes a duty on the owner of a registered trademark to monitor and police
its trademarks.5 However, as Mike Masnick of Tech Dirt Blog asks, "Would
anyone really confuse R2D2 with an ad platform service?"6 Masnick's ques-
tion speaks to the long-established basis for trademark infringement-deter-
mining the likelihood of confusion between mutually shared consumer
communities.7 In other words, would consumers, caught in any potential
market crossover, wrongfully associate the source of a product or service
with a similar trademark?
October, 2011, www.addroid.com is a fully-launched website offering custom-
ized web-based, video advertising.
2. Mike Masnick, Would a Moron In a Hurry Confuse R2D2 with an Ad Plat-
form? No? But George Lucas Would, TECHDIRT (Sept. 15, 2010, 6:42 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100913/20475810995.shtml.
3. See id. (explaining that in addition to the trademark infringement cease-and-
desist letters to Cooper, Lucas utilized his copyright light saber and sent similar
cease-and-desist letters to companies such as Wicked Laser and Jedi Mind);
see also Jeremy Taylor, George Lucas Wields Cease and Desist Orders Like a
Jedi Does a Lightsaber, ASYLUM (July 9, 2010), http://www.asylum.com/2010/
07/09/george-lucas-wields-cease-and-desist-orders-like-star-wars-jedi-light-
saber/.
4. Forbes 400: #109 George Lucas, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/
george-lucas/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
5. See Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1110-11
(N.D. Cal. 2008) ("[A] trademark owner has a duty to police its rights against
potential infringers..."); see also 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:38 (4th ed. 2011) (observing that a
duty is imposed on trademark owners to police their rights against infringers).
6. Masnick, supra note 2.
7. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). See generally A&H
Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.
1999) ("To succeed in a claim for trademark infringement ... the owner of a
valid and legally protectable mark.., must show that the defendant has used a
confusingly similar mark.").
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Elsewhere on the information superhighway, Facebook, with an esti-
mated net worth of $41 billion,8 is forcing smaller online businesses into
similar situations as Cooper faced with Lucas.9 Facebook has rained down
threats of lawsuits on various website companies that use domain names con-
taining the terms "face" or "book."10 On the receiving end of these suits are
websites that serve various purposes: Teachbook, an Illinois-based online
community where educators can share lesson plans and other materials,"I and
Placebook, a site offering users tools for organizing and documenting trips.12
Having only launched in Fall 2010, Teachbook vowed to play the role of
David to Facebook's Goliath.13 Teachbook stated that they would face the
lawsuit head on.'4 Placebook, whose fight with Facebook began soon after its
website launched in May 2010, decided to avoid the potentially costly legal
fight and instead changed its name to TripTrace.i5
In response to Facebook's trademark protection campaign, a parody site
called Lamebook-featuring Facebook users' lesser moments-tried to beat
the social network at its own game by seeking to enjoin Facebook from alleg-
ing trademark infringement against them.16 In November 2010, Facebook re-
sponded with a countersuit, adding Lamebook to its list of would-be
infringers.'7 At the time, Lamebook was involved in a deal with clothing
8. Jackie Cohen, Facebook's Valuation Skyrockets to $41 Billion, ALLFACEBOOK
(Nov. 15, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://www.allFacebook.com/Facebooks-valua-
tion-skyrockets-to-41 -billion-2010-11.
9. FacebookTM is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
under various trademark serials for goods and services related to the social
networking website Facebook.com. See Trademark Electronic Search System
(TESS), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://tess2.uspto.gov (follow "Basic
Word Mark Search (New User)" hyperlink; then type "Facebook" into search
dialog) (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
10. Jackie Cohen, Facebook Fires Back at Lamebook with Lawsuit, ALLFACEBOOK
(Nov. 16, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.allfacebook.com/facebook-fires-back-
at-lamebook-with-a-lawsuit-2010-1 1.
11. Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Pokes Start-Up Teachbook with Lawsuit, CNET
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010, 12:06 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-
20014700-36.html.
12. Facebook Stomps on Us. TRIPrTRACE (Aug. 2, 2010), http://blog.triptrace.
com/2010/08/02/facebook-stomps/.
13. David Kravets, Teachbook Vows Facebook Trademark Suit Fight, WIRED
(Aug. 25, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/08/upstart-
attacks-Facebook/.
14. Id.
15. See TRIPTRACE, supra note 12.
16. Cohen, supra note 10.
17. Id.
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retailer Urban Outfitters,8 a 5.4 billion dollar brand, on a coffee table rendi-
tion of the website, perhaps providing the motivating factor for getting to
Facebook first. Inherent to Lamebook's case is the copyright notion of fair
use, which includes parody.19 The topic of trademark use in parody is briefly
discussed later but is largely beyond the scope of this article. As Masnick
asks of Cooper's use of "droid,"20 will the general public assume any site
beginning with "face" or ending in "book" is offered and/or sponsored by
Facebook?
Undoubtedly, the likes of George Lucas and Facebook have expended
much time, energy, and money to obtain the level of recognition afforded by
their trademarks; billion dollar net valuations are certainly not born on the
backs of the languid. At one time, "droid" was simply a popular suffix indi-
cating something having mechanical qualities. The only "Facebook" anyone
was aware of came in the form of a printed pamphlet containing the names
and faces of their fellow incoming college freshmen. By adopting the terms
as trademarks, subsequently registered with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, these producers2l transformed the term's common as-
sociations and connotations into brand and product identifiers-the very es-
sence of trademark law. Like any other valid trademarks, Facebook's and
Lucas's trademarks are at risk of losing the meaning and significance they
represent. Thus, as trademark law requires, protective measures are rightfully
and necessarily taken by mark owners to ensure marks retain their strength
and unique meaning in the marketplace.
Our current trademark system provides many incentives for proper
trademark development. It affords a monopoly to trademark owners, whose
brands the consuming public identifies as the source of the goods or services
and establishes clear channels to eliminate would-be infringers. Indeed, the
law obligates trademark owners to regularly police their marks for unautho-
rized use by third parties who create a likelihood of confusion. The failure to
police does not go without consequence. The long-established doctrine of
laches eliminates remedial channels to mark owners who fail to consistently
take action against infringers.22 No doubt, trademarks have become vital or-
gans of the free-market system and often represent the value of a business
itself. Consistent interpretation and expansion of trademark law in the past
century has morphed it from a producer-identifier/consumer protection to a
full-on business information capsule, capable of housing business image and
consumer impression. Twentieth-century changes in trademark law, as well
as ideas expanding trademark valuation and remedial concepts, have given
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Masnick, supra note 2.
21. "Producer" is used to denote one as a maker, manufacturer, distributor of
goods, or an offeror of services.
22. See infra text accompanying note 117.
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trademark users the means to better develop and protect their marks than was
previously possible.
Despite the progression of trademark law, trademark policing and pro-
tection favors those with the financial resources to spare. These same tools,
meant to bring order and purpose to the marketplace, are now susceptible to
"weaponization" by firms with strong market power and massive fortunes.
Large, established entities often leverage their power in the market by
overzealously asserting their trademark rights against small businesses that
attempt to use similar marks, regardless of whether these small businesses'
similar uses would actually ever cause a likelihood of confusion among con-
sumers. The result is an imbalance, placing unintentional and damaging limi-
tations on hopeful users and granting well-financed mark owners the tools to
snuff out competition, create mark monopolies affording no room for similar
marks whose use would not cause confusion, and hamper the free-market
system. Trademark law requires entities to protect their marks.23 However, at
what point do George Lucas and Facebook go from valiant trademark de-
fenders to playground bullies throwing their weight around? Are they fight-
ing against true foes distributing similar set of products using a confusingly
similar mark,24 or are George Lucas and Facebook just flexing financial mus-
cle to spoil others' efforts? The line has not been clearly drawn and will
remain ambiguous unless greater effort is made to properly distinguish pro-
tection from bullying or courts begin to punish trademark-system abusers.
This article will examine the two established, yet conflicting, theories of
trademark law: Source Theory and Quality Theory.25 Rooted in the history of
trademark law, Source Theory contains the foundations for trademark law
and its purpose. 26 The standard for infringement under this theory is the
"likelihood of confusion," which creates the necessity for a mark's distinc-
tiveness.2 7 In discussing the theory, this article will briefly look at the histori-
cal foundations of trademark law, the import of trademark distinctiveness,
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D) (2012).
24. See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982)
("[T]he infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the
goods of competing manufactures"); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beef-
eater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976) ("A 'trademark' is not that which
is infringed. What is infringed is the right of the public to be free of confusion
and the synonymous fight of a trademark owner to control his product's reputa-
tion."); Max Factor & Co. v. Factor, 226 F. Supp. 120, 124 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
("'[U]nder the [trademark] owner's name ... he may protect it . . . against
those who use the name to sell goods near enough alike to confuse his custom-
ers."' (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d
Cir. 1940))).
25. See 1-1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03[1] (2013)
[hereinafter "GILsoN"].
26. Id. at § 1.03[11].
27. Id. at § 1.03[2].
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and its impact on the validity and strength of a mark. This article will then
introduce Quality Theory, which purports that a trademark is able to house
and communicate both business image and consumer protection.28 The dis-
cussion of Quality Theory will delve into several legal expansions, including
goodwill in trademark value and dilution statutes, and the unrest resulting
from judicial attempts to harmonize the two theories. This article affirms the
need for trademark owners to police their marks, but calls for the courts to
offer relief to secondary mark users who are unfairly targeted by established
mark owners in the name of policing.
II. TRADEMARK'S ROLE IN THE FREE MARKETPLACE
In a marketplace that constantly changes, trademarks assist in stabilizing
the economy, encouraging honest business practices, providing a low-cost
method for communicating brand quality, and contributing to consumer reli-
ance and loyalty, which would otherwise only be obtainable through other
extensive and costly methods. In its simplest form, a trademark is the neces-
sary visual link between a producer and the goods or services it distributes.
Without the outline of a woman riding horseback appearing on the packag-
ing, consumers may struggle to distinguish Godiva chocolate from chocolate
made by Ghirardelli or Lindt, making brand loyalty and intentional repeat
business impossible. If the brand's distinct name and mark were removed,
discerning the maker of two different chocolate bars for sale would require
an investigation most consumers would likely not care to embark upon when
making purchasing decisions. Also, without a trademark system, it would be
very difficult to determine liability for defective commercial products and
services.
A functioning trademark system orchestrates the many components of a
marketplace where the goals of producers, competitors, and consumers are
all met. The producer of goods adopts the mark of his choice and maintains
the exclusive use of that name, device, or symbol;29 the competitor distin-
guishes his products, and the consumer develops an awareness of the prod-
ucts available based on their preferences. Trademarks are the simple solution
to the varying interests of a marketplace that both encourages competition
and seeks to fortify consumer peace of mind. Without trademarks, the mar-
ketplace would be a frenetic hub of frustration for producers, competitors,
and consumers alike. A trademark assumes a certain value for each producer,
and has historically remained intangible. The expansion of societies and busi-
nesses, however, has ultimately caused trademarks to develop dramatically
more tangible valuations and begin to function as more than mere source
identifiers. As the twentieth century arose, courts struggled to merge tradi-
28. See id. at § 1.03[3].
29. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (establish-
ing that a color or symbol may be used as a trademark if it meets the requisite
distinction and use); see also infra text accompanying note 46.
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tional trademark concepts with developing trademark uses without expanding
the law and broadening the definition of a trademark's value. The trademark
is a keystone to a productive economy; however, the evolution of trademark
treatment by courts has subsequently given larger entities more grounds for
legal action. Trademark law is currently in a state of unrest, largely due to a
century of unorganized judicial attempts to harmonize the Source Theory and
the Quality Theory, two theories of trademark law that are not wholly
compatible.
III. CONFLICTING THEORIES OF TRADEMARK LAW
Source Theory, present in the earliest of trademark systems, bases a
trademark's value on its ability to identify the source of products.30 Quality
Theory, which gained recognition in the early twentieth century, finds the
strength of a mark's beating heart in the goodwill the mark harnesses for the
brand, including the owner's image and consumer's impression.3' Rooted in
Source Theory is the "likelihood of confusion" test, the long-established ba-
sis for trademark infringement.32 Action for infringement arose under this
test when a secondary use of a mark was so similarly situated, typically
caught in market crossover, that consumer confusion about the true source of
the product was considered likely.33 Conversely, expansions of the trademark
system resulting from Quality Theory's advancement moved away from
"likelihood of confusion" and into a generalized realm of prohibiting similar
mark use as a general means of protecting against diminishing mark unique-
ness.34 Currently, both theories of trademark remain distinct, although Qual-
ity Theory is dependent upon Source Theory. As such, the functions of
trademarks now extend beyond source identification. Gilson on Trademarks
states the multiple functions currently assigned to trademarks:
A trademark functions and is accorded legal protection because it:
(a) designates the source or origin of a particular product or ser-
vice, even though the source is to the consumer anonymous; (b)
denotes a particular standard of quality which is embodied in the
product or service; (c) identifies a product or service and distin-
guishes it from the products or services of others; (d) symbolizes
the goodwill of its owner and motivates consumers to purchase the
trademarked product or service; (e) represents a substantial adver-
tising investment and is treated as a species of property; or (f)
protects the public from confusion and deception, insures that con-
sumers are able to purchase the products and services they want,
30. See GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.03[2].
31. Id. at § 1.0313], [11].
32. Id. at § 1.03[2].
33. Id.
34. Id. at § 1.03[11].
2014]
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and enables the courts to fashion a standard of acceptable business
conduct.35
Both theories accurately represent trademark's function in a marketplace, but
they have proven highly difficult to harmonize. This is largely the result of
marketplace and court efforts to assign tangible value to goodwill that at best
is indefinable. These expansions, though valuable in protecting a business's
goodwill stake in its trademark, are compounded by messy judicial interpre-
tations opening the door to allow mark owners to use their rights in ways that
may potentially stomp out competition, stymie creativity, and suppress free
speech under the guise of protecting the mark and its value. Chick-fil-A is a
recent actor. In November of 2011, Chick-fil-A asserted its "Eat mor
Chikin"' tagline and other trademarks against Vermont resident Robert "Bo"
Muller-Moore's "Eat More Kale" tagline and trademark.36 Chick-fil-A cited
policing as the reason for asserting its trademark rights and stated, "We must
legally protect and defend our 'Eat mor chikin' trademarks in order to main-
tain rights to the slogan."37 Perhaps Chik-fil-A is correctly policing its mark
liquidity as courts have stated must be done. However, would a marketed
suggestion to eat more of anything trigger thoughts of Chik-fil-A in the ab-
sence of cows with poor spelling offering it?38 In this instance, it seems un-
likely that if Bo's kale is not fresh, no consumer will blame Chik-fil-A.
A. Source Theory: Prevention of Consumer Confusion and
Competitor Counterfeit
Source Theory cannot be fully understood without first examining the
roots of modem trademark law, as noted trademark scholar and author Frank
Schechter has remarked is often overlooked:
35. Id. at § 1.03(1).
36. Jess Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, but T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES(Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/us/eat-more-kale-t-shirts-
challenged-by-chick-fil-a.html.
37. Kirk Phillips, Which Came First? The Chicken or the Kale?, BRANDSTOKE
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.brandstoke.com/2011/12/07/which-came-first-
chicken-or-kale/.
38. In a conversation with two Baylor law school students, Megan Walker and
Wills Collier, the students seemingly hopped onto the corporate bandwagon
insisting that Chick-fil-A's action should not be considered "bullying" but
rather an attempt to prevent the Eat mor Chickin trademark from dilution. After
explaining the requirement for actual dilution versus likelihood of dilution they
began to ponder why Muller-Moore did not raise a parody defense. Notwith-
standing, outrage of the general public has led to what some might say is a
social intolerance of trademark owners' forceful fists against the little guy's
expressions that poses no risks whatsoever in creating a likelihood of
confusion.
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[P]ractitioners ... of trade-mark law have.., been quite content
to regard that law as practically the creation of the nineteenth cen-
tury, without attempting in any way to ascertain the extent to
which trade-marks had been used prior to the nineteenth century,
the functions or purposes which these trade-marks had served and
the methods, if any, by which they came under any form of legal
protection or surveillance.39
Trademarks are as old as the records of man, with semblances of trademark
concepts appearing in the earliest civilizations.40 Trademark presence per-
sisted into the Middle Ages, where consumers lived in segregated societies
and often personally knew the manufacturers of the products they pur-
chased.41 The mark protected a producer's reputation and prevented his or
her goods from being passed off as the goods of another.42 These adaptations
of trademark usage demonstrate that even before the establishment of En-
glish Common Law, mankind had discovered the practicalities of trade-
marks. 43 Trademark usage remained intact through Western interpretation
and governance of the field to: (1) prevent consumer confusion and deception
by aligning the source with the product; and (2) prevent competitors from
copying those aspects of a product that identify the source of the product. 44
The usefulness of trademarks has not changed in the centuries since, but
the need for a fluid and organized trademark system grew as industries ex-
panded and marketplaces became less geographically defined.45 Through the
sixteenth century and until the early seventeenth century, when the English
39. FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO TRADE-MARKS 11 (1925).
40. See GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.0611] ("Through his mark, a scratchy form of
commercial signature, the potter could be identified with the quality of his
craftsmanship by all who saw his work." (citing Gerald Ruston, On the Origin
of Trademarks, in 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 127 (1955))); id. at § 1.06[l] n.2
("Ruston cites jars buried in tombs of 1st Dynasty Egyptian Kings, but also
mentions markings on pottery of the Stone Age period, c. 5000 B.C.").
41. Id. at § 1.03[1l].
42. See id.
43. See generally GILSON, supra note 25, at §1.06[l].
44. See id. at § 1.03.
45. Id. ("[T]he Industrial Revolution and the Twentieth Century explosions of pop-
ulation, communications, transportation and technology placed the consumer at
a substantial distance from the manufacturer."); see also Family Circle, Inc. v.
Family Circle Assocs., 332 F.2d 534, 539 (3d Cir. 1964) ("[A]s has been
pointed out by the very courts that define trademarks in terms of ownership or
origin, that owing to the ramifications of modern trade and international distri-
bution of goods from the manufacturer to the jobber or importer and retailer to
the consumer, the source or origin of the goods bearing a well-known trade-
mark is seldom known to the consumer.").
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courts considered the matter,46 trademark concerns were largely privatized.47
As the English courts' awareness of private trademark governance expanded,
they began to absorb the concepts into their developing legal aura. Move-
ment of trademark theory towards producer reliance and away from competi-
tor counterfeit made its earliest appearance in the English Courts in Southern
v. How, in a bit of extraneous commentary regarding the infringement of a
clothier's mark:
[T]he action upon the case was brought in the Common Pleas by a
clothier, that whereas he had gained great reputation for his mak-
ing of his cloth by reason whereof he had great utterance to his
benefit and profit, and that he used to set his mark on his cloth
whereby it should be known to be his cloth: and another clothier,
observing it, used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose
to deceive him; and it was resolved that the action did well lie.48
Southern is regarded as early authority for the idea that unauthorized use of a
trademark counters its purposes and creates grounds for action. 49 References
recognizing Southern's prominence appear in many American trademark
cases of the early twentieth century. 50 While Southern planted a seed, trade-
mark litigation in English courts did not emerge again until the mid-eight-
eenth century when a tradesman sought injunctive relief against infringement
but was denied by the Lord Chancellor, who feared outright protection of
trademarks would foster monopolies in the marketplace.51 Though a tightly
constrained monopoly on an image, name, or presentation of a brand is nec-
essary to a trademark's function, perhaps Lord Chancellor rightfully feared
some of the greater vagaries of opening the door to such monopolies.
There was a noticeable lack of trademark litigation in the early eight-
eenth century. Nonetheless, the potential benefits of source-to-product in-
dicators in the marketplace gained attention, and Parliament implemented
statutes in select trades that permitted a producers to use marks as a means of
identifying products and protecting themselves from counterfeiters.52 Produc-
ers targeted consumers on a broader plane as industry expanded with changes
46. Schechter, supra note 39, at 125.
47. Id. at 16 (stating that trade was largely conducted through private "gilds," or
organizations, which also presided over arbitrated matters between tradesmen,
including when one would use another's mark without permission).
48. Id. at 6 (quoting Southern v. How).
49. See id. at 9-10 (treating Southern v. How as trademark authority to justify
passing off as a well-recognized action for the last 250 years (citing Magnolia
Metal Co. v. Tandem Smelting Syndicate, Ltd., 17 R.P.C. 477, 483 (1900))).
50. See id.
51. See Blanchard v. Hill, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (P.C.).
52. See An Act for Better Regulation of the Linen and Hempen Manufacturers in
that Part of Great Britain Called Scotland, 1726, 9 Geo. 1, c. 27, § 57 (Scot.).
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in manufacturing, technology, and general social and economic practices.53
As the need for product-source identifiers became greater than ever before,
the English and young American courts took notice.54 Indeed, in an option-
filled market gone unchecked, the danger is great for a low-eaming competi-
tor to pass his products off as those made by a successful competitor. This
scenario would defeat consumers' ability to determine product quality and
develop preference for a certain producer's goods over another, thus further
diminishing consumer confidence in economies and marketplaces. Econo-
mies could never hope for stability. The worst of this had yet to materialize
when American manufacturers became impatient with losses suffered from
infringements and pled to the legislature for relief.55 Founding Father
Thomas Jefferson became an avid proponent of creating a system where the
federal and state registration of producer marks would serve to cement their
rights to protection and relief for unauthorized use of the registered mark.56
Indeed, this proposed registration system served to put others on notice that
the producer was claiming a right to the mark on his products.57 Jefferson and
others recognized trademarks "contribute to the fidelity" of the marketplace,
promoting innovative production, fair competition, and consumer trust by
significantly decreasing the ease at which deception and fraud could infiltrate
the marketplace.58
Early American trademark case law quickly established the value of a
mark's distinctive quality as a useful source identifier and guard against com-
petitor fraud. In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the Supreme Court
highlighted these traditional purposes as it explained the producer's sanctity
in his mark:
Where a party has been in the habit of labeling his goods with a
distinctive mark, so that purchasers recognize goods . . . as being
of his production, others are debarred from applying the same
mark to goods of the same description, because to do so would in
effect represent their goods to be of his production and would tend
53. See Schechter, supra note 39, at 130.
54. See id.
55. See Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, Manufacturer's Marks (Dec. 9, 1791)
("[A trademark system] would ... contribute to fidelity in the execution of
manufacturers, to secure to every manufactory an exclusive right to some mark
on its wares, proper to itself."), reprinted in I AM. ST. PAPERS COMM. & NAVI-
GATION 48 (1832).
56. Id. ("That this should be done by general laws .. that this may be done by
permitting the owner of every manufactory to enter into the records of the court
of the district wherein his manufactory is, the name with which he chooses to
mark or designate his wares, and rendering it penal in others to put the same
mark to any other wares.").
57. See id.
58. See Schechter, supra note 39, at 130-31.
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to deprive him of the profit he might make through the sale of the
goods which the purchaser intended to buy.59
Less than a decade after the Supreme Court decided Hanover Star, the fed-
eral government registered more than 15,000 trademarks, evidencing pro-
ducer confidence in the system and eagerness to claim territory in the
marketplace.60 In 1970, there were 23,447 federal registrations granted and
33,326 applications filed.61 In 2011, there were 398,667 applications filed
and 177,661 certificates of registration given.62 Trademark registration con-
tinues to grow exponentially and litigation continues to increasingly invade
United States courtrooms.
1. Distinctiveness: The Basis of a Trademark's Ability to
Distinguish
Distinctiveness is the soul of a valid and registrable trademark. Distinc-
tiveness is also a necessary component of trademark law that can frustrate
mark owners. If a mark fails to stand apart from another mark, it fails its
function as a source identifier for corresponding products. Marks that are not
distinctive may cause consumer confusion, especially if the similarly marked
products share market crossover. Coupled with its use in commerce, 63 a dis-
tinctive mark gains consumer awareness and earns protection. Distinctive-
ness is necessary for the creation and registration of a trademark, but it is
neither synonymous with the originality needed for copyright nor the novelty
needed to earn a patent:
The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of some-
thing already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party
using it. At common law the exclusive right to a trademark grows
out of its use, and not its mere adoption. By the act of Congress
this exclusive right attaches upon registration. But in neither case
does it depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of
the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no labori-
ous thought. It is simply founded on the priority of
appropriation.64
59. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (emphasis
added).
60. See Schechter, supra note 39, at 134.
61. GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.01 (citing United States Trademark Association
1971 Year End Report).
62. Id.
63. See Dep't. of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118,
1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the common law requires a mark to have
been used in commerce before it can be protected by the owner).
64. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
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Distinctiveness is purely action-oriented, sprouting from specific and for-
mulaic producer efforts to harmonize a mark with his products and nestle the
association into consumer awareness. Unlike its intellectual property breth-
ren, trademarks are the application of something already created and then
adopted by a producer with the intent to transform it into a marketplace sym-
bol. "To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have invented
the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership
must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or
services."65
As expressed in the Trade-Mark Cases, adopting a trademark requires
little effort.66 However, making a trademark valuable and effective in the
marketplace as a tool for communicating information about a product does
require effort. Rooted in its ability to identify the "origin or ownership,"67 a
consumer should identify a mark only with the sources of origin or owner-
ship intended by the producer:
[T]o acquire the right to the exclusive use of a name, device, or
symbol as a trademark, it must appear that it is adopted for the
purpose of identifying the origin or ownership of the article to
which it is attached, or that such trade-mark must point distinc-
tively, either by itself or by association, to the origin, manufacture,
or ownership of the article on which it was stamped.68
An adopted mark distinguishing a producer's goods in a marketplace69 earns
common law protection; once the distinguished use of a mark is recognized
by the consuming public as denoting the producer's goods, meaning the pro-
ducer has made efforts to insert his mark into consumer consciousness, it
may be federally registered.
Distinctiveness is a matter of degree. The more distinctive a word or
symbol is, the greater strength it has as an identifier of the product source. In
the marketplace, a mark with greater distinction more easily suits trademark
purposes. Thus, a producer is incentivized to adopt a highly distinct mark
because it lends itself to greater protection. A strong mark-one with greater
distinction-is easier to streamline into consumer consciousness as symbol
of origin or ownership. Marks with a greater degree of distinctiveness are
65. Sengoku Works, Ltd. v. RMC Int'l., Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996).
66. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
67. Colombia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463 (1893).
68. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining the word "trademark" as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof: (1) used by a person, or (2)
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce.., to identify or
distinguish [his] goods")) (emphasis added).
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often inherently distinct, and their ability to identify a source is presumed.70
Weaker marks-those consisting of words or symbols in their commonly
recognized contexts-must gain distinctiveness through "secondary mean-
ing" to prove the mark has "acquired" a "source-identifying" meaning apart
from its ordinary, common usage. 71
"[A] mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently dis-
tinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, 'in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself.' "72
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, the Second Circuit pro-
vided the most illustrative analysis of mark distinction by categorizing trade-
mark terms into four classes of distinctiveness and "[arraying them] in an
ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility for trademark status
and the degree of protection accorded."73 The court listed the classes as "(1)
generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful."74
"Generic" describes a term that has "come to be understood as referring,
to the genus of which the particular product is a species."75 It is a term "com-
monly used to denote a product or other item ... the thing itself, rather than
any particular feature or exemplification of it."76 Because a generic term is
"commonly used as the name or description of a kind of goods,"77 it is use-
less as an identifier of product origin or ownership, having zero distinction. It
is "irretrievably in the public domain, and the preservation of competition
precludes its protection."78 Generic terms are incapable of being registered
and do not receive any common law protection.
A "descriptive" mark describes product characteristics and has been
subcategorized into two classes: "commonly descriptive" and "merely de-
scriptive."79 The "commonly descriptive" term is synonymous with the ge-
70. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (citing Inwood
Labs., 456 U.S. at 851).
71. See id. (qualifying that "secondary meaning" has since come to refer to the
acquired, source-identifying meaning of a non-word mark as well).
72. See id. (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 851 n.11).
73. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1039
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
77. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.
1977).
78. Henri's Food Prods., Co. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir.
1987).
79. Door Sys., Inc. v. Overhead Door Sys., Inc., No. 91 C 8050, 1993 LEXIS 7609,
at *12 (N.D. I11. June 3, 1993).
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neric term, identifying a product type by its characteristics, and permanently
cemented in the public domain.80 A "merely descriptive" mark describes
product characteristics and can be registered if it distinctly represents the
applicant's goods upon a showing of secondary meaning, specifically, that "it
has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce."81 An example
of the difficulty in differentiating "commonly descriptive" and "merely de-
scriptive" terms can be found in the Seventh Circuit case Henri's Food Prod-
ucts v. Tasty Snacks, where the court held "tasty dressing" was "merely
descriptive."82 The Court contrasted their case to Miller Brewing and the use
of "LITE beer,"83 in which "'[t]he word "light," including its phonetic
equivalent "lite" . . . [is] a generic or common descriptive term as applied to
beer, [and] could not be exclusively appropriated.., as a trademark, "despite
whatever promotional effort may have [been] expended to exploit it...'.. 84
Departing from reasoning of the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin,
which classified "tasty dressing" as "commonly descriptive,"85 the Seventh
Circuit noted:
[U]nlike "light beer," "tasty salad dressing" is not a kind, sort,
genus or subcategory of salad dressing. Rather, "tasty" is "merely
descriptive" and describes a quality found in many genuses of
salad dressing. It is not an adjective which in any way serves to
classify the noun to which it is attached.86
The court noted that this type of "merely descriptive" word theoretically
could convey a secondary meaning. "'Merely descriptive' terms convey a
quality or characteristic of the product. The term 'tasty' describes the quality
of the salad dressing. There really can be no suggestion that 'tasty dressing'
is a kind or type or subcategory of dressing such as, for example, French
dressing."87 A "merely descriptive" term becomes capable of trademark pro-
tection and subsequent registration when, through the efforts of the adopting
producer, the term acquires secondary meaning as a source identifier apart
from the term's ordinary meaning.88
80. Id. at *12-13.
81. Id. at *13 (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
194 (1985)).
82. See Henri's Food Prods., 817 F.2d at 1305.
83. See Miller Brewing, 561 F.2d at 79.
84. Henri's Food Prods., 817 F.2d. at 1305 (quoting Miller Brewing, 561 F.2d at
79).
85. Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 255, 259 (E.D.
Wis. 1986), rev'd, 817 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1987).
86. Henri's Food Prods., 817 F.2d at 1306.
87. Id.
88. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211.
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Sitting somewhere between the "descriptive" and "fanciful" classes, a
"suggestive" term "requires imagination, thought, and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of goods."89 "Suggestive" terms are defined as
having inherently distinctive meaning, the association between the mark and
its source is presumed and the mark is eligible for trademark protection.90
Though a suggestive term may capture some of the qualities of a product, it
stands apart from a descriptive term, which "conveys an immediate idea of
the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods."91
Also inherently distinctive are "arbitrary" and "fanciful" terms. 92 "Arbi-
trary" or "fanciful" terms bear no relation to the product and therefore de-
serve protection.93 A mark is arbitrary if it "is well-known in a different
context" apart from its source-identifying use.94 A mark is fanciful "if it is
newly invented" for the source-identifying use and not otherwise established
in any other context.95
2. Burdens Associated with Distinction
Once a mark has obtained distinction to any degree, it becomes a com-
modity to the producer because it now carries the ability to distinguish his
products from those of his competitors. While a mark with distinction has
value and is worthy of protection, it is not free from burden. Once obtained, a
mark may not always retain its distinction. Mark distinction may shift along
with ever-changing consumer awareness and is constantly at risk of becom-
ing "generic" if a producer does not monitor his mark's use in the market-
place. It is the protection of distinction that laid the groundwork for the
previously mentioned allegations of infringement lodged by Lucas,
Facebook, and Chik-fil-A.
3. Shifting Distinction
As consumer awareness changes and the market place shifts, it is en-
tirely possible for a mark's identifying power to shift as well. The Second
Circuit states that:
The lines of demarcation, however, are not always bright. Moreo-
ver, the difficulties are compounded because a term that is in one
89. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
90. See id.
91. Id. (quoting Stix Prods., 295 F. Supp. at 488).
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category for a particular product may be in quite a different one
for another, because a term may shift from one category to another
in light of differences in usage through time, because a term may
have one meaning to one group of users and a different one to
others, and because the same term may be put to different uses
with respect to a single product.96
Thus, the contextual and environmental conditions the mark is associated
with are highly relevant to the distinction it carries. For example, when asso-
ciated with computer systems, the term "Apple" is arbitrary. But an apple
grower would find it impossible to adopt this mark as signifying the crop he
produces. It would be poor branding, and no producer can claim the sole
rights to use the product genus as a brand.97 Genus terms are inherently ge-
neric and therefore remain in the public domain.98
Maintaining distinction of a mark can be an uphill battle for a producer
because they must fight against the winds of a constantly evolving market to
preserve a mark's value. The fight is partially won in the first round when a
producer chooses an arbitrary, fanciful, or a suggestive mark. As seen with
the dilemma posed by common descriptive or merely descriptive marks,
terms that avoid directly revealing a product's qualities or characteristics are
more useful in the marketplace and thus more capable of achieving trade-
mark purposes. A mark owner must develop his symbol into a valid trade-
mark recognized by the public as indicative of his products, but this process
is easier when he chooses a non-descriptive mark creatively at the outset.99
For the producer choosing a descriptive mark, efforts must focus on shifting
consumer awareness away from a term's ordinary meaning and towards the
"secondary" source identifying the producer's intended meaning.100 This is
not an easy task, but it has been done successfully.10,
96. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9.
97. See id. at 9-10; Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 369.
98. See Henri's Food Prods., 817 F.2d at 1305.
99. See Bazaar Del Mundo, 448 F.3d at 1126.
100. See Henri's Food Prods., 817 F.2d at 1307.
101. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938) (holding
Kellogg's wheat puff cereal trademarked as "Shredded Wheat" to be highly
descriptive of the product, but validating trademark rights because the mark
had developed "secondary meaning" within the marketplace, indicating not just
the shape and grain of the cereal but also, specifically the Kellogg product).
2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
4. Genericide
No matter the degree of distinction, a mark owner's worst fear is a
transformation into the colloquial term for his product class.102 Producers
must find the middle ground between expending too little effort to establish
distinction for their mark in a marketplace, and oversaturating to the point of
synonymizing a product brand with the class of products itself. Once a term,
trademarked or not, becomes referential to a product type, class, or genus, it
belongs to the public domain and cannot be validly transformed into a dis-
tinctive trademark.03 A generic classification becomes the fear of any pro-
ducer who has spent time, money, and effort to distinguish a mark in the
marketplace because generic classification indicates a point of no return.
"The [Lanham] Act provides for the cancellation of a registered mark if
at any time it 'becomes the common descriptive [or generic] name of an
article or substance.'"04. The Second Circuit found that "[t]his means that
even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some 'merely descrip-
tive' marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject
for trademark."105 The court further noted that "no matter how much money
and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting [merchandise
sales] and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an
article by its name."106
When threatened by genericide, producers must overhaul their advertis-
ing and communication schemes. In modern trademark practice, producers
with threatened marks have, out of necessity, resorted to various strategies to
keep the endangered marks alive. This extra spending is needed to provide
new significance and meaning to a mark that teeters on the edge of generi-
cally signifying a whole product classes. Examples of fallen marks resigned
to the generic graveyard include "Escalator" (Otis Elevator Co. trademark for
the rotating staircase),07 "Aspirin" (Bayer trademark for acetylsalicylic
102. See Losing Trademark Rights, INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW GRP., http://www.
iplg.com/resources/articles/losing-trademark-rights.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2013) (explaining genericide).
103. See Henri's Food Prods., 817 F.2d at 1305.
104. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (quoting The Trademark Act of 1905
§ 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1950)
(finding that "Escalator" had become a generic term).
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acid),108 "Thermos" (Thermos GmbH trademark name for a vacuum flask),09
and "Yo-Yo" (Papa's Toy Co. Ltd. trademark for a spinning toy). 10
Traditionally, a mark's decline towards generic may surprise a producer
when brand popularity is high. Kids with cuts and scrapes requesting Band-
Aids, or the sniffling friend asking, "Where's the Kleenex?" indicate brand
awareness and confidence. However, both Band-Aid,"I and Kleenex112 saw
their brands become synonymous with their respective product classes, i.e.,
bandages and facial tissue paper. Band-Aid sought to avoid their generic
brand problem by slightly modifying their commercial jingle, drawing clear
focus to the word "brand." The kids, happy to be protected by Band-Aid
bandages, now sing, "I am stuck on Band-Aid brand, 'cause Band-Aid's
stuck on me." Kleenex has long been victimized by pervasive generic use by
consumers, but still remains a valid trademark.
The brand Google,"13 an embodiment of a newly created fanciful mark
that now represents the preeminent Internet search-engine, has become so
synonymous with the act of searching for something on the Internet that con-
sumers transformed the mark into a verb when suggesting someone perform
an Internet search. "Just Google it." Google is not passive on this matter. Still
measures to reverse this association and retain brand strength do not always
correct a problem that can quickly tumble out of control in a time when
thoughts, associations, or memes have the potential to go viral in minutes.114
Dr. Julie Coleman, an authority on linguistics from the University of
Leicester, suggests that while Google is unable to slap every impermissible
use of "Google" with a lawsuit, the company could pursue other avenues
such as "forc[ing] dictionaries to mention its origin in a trade-marked brand
name, which is what the Oxford English Dictionary already does."]5 Even
though some may consider a mark slipping towards generic as the highest
108. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (showing
that the consumer believes the word Aspirin has a broader scope than that of
the Bayer Co. product).
109. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir.
1963).
110. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 667-68
(7th Cir. 1965).
111. BAND-AID, Registration No. 3,998,863 (including "design plus words, letters,
and/or numbers.").
112. KLEENEX, Registration No. 4,053,214 (registered for "standard character
mark.").
113. GOOGLE, Registration No. 4,058,966 (includes word mark for a host of In-
ternet-based and electronic products and services).
114. Will Sturgeon, Google Spells Out Its Verb Case Scenario, ZDNET (Aug. 14,




SMU Science and Technology Law Review
form of brand flattery, producers, who wish to maintain mark protection,
often fear such generic status as a trademark black hole.
B. Quality Theory: Protection of Business Goodwill
While Source Theory remains a functioning theory of trademark law,
the rise of the twentieth century's booming business landscape, and resulting
judicial interpretations of trademark law, broadened the scope of what trade-
marks can identify. Twentieth century treatment of trademark rights as tangi-
ble property forced lawmakers to recognize that trademark, in addition to
identifying producer goods and services, also captured the consuming pub-
lic's perception of a producer's standards and product quality. This secon-
dary interest in protecting a mark called for expansions of trademark law that
stepped beyond the established "likelihood of confusion" grounds for in-
fringement. Proponents of Quality Theory target any use of a similar mark,
regardless of market crossover, citing the uses as attempting to capture and
diminish the quality and standards represented, thereby weakening their
mark. Relying on the intangible and ubiquitous concept of goodwill as a
component to a trademark's value, Quality Theory required the trademark to
shoulder this goodwill, which proved impossible without expansions to the
law. These expansions, namely brand dilution and initial interest confusion,
are necessary to protect certain owners' rights, but inconsistent judicial inter-
pretation and unanswered questions have ushered in potential for abuse.
What is the measure to determine if a mark owner has sufficiently policed the
value of his mark? Can a brand with a great amount of goodwill justify a
degree of policing that appears arbitrary and perhaps insidious to one who
knows the standards for infringement?
1. Trademark as a Symbol of Owner's Goodwill
The historical conception of a trademark as a strict emblem or source of
the product to which it attaches has been largely abandoned. The burgeoning
business of franchising has made trademark licensing a widespread commer-
cial practice and has resulted in the development of a new rationale for trade-
marks as representations of product quality. This is particularly true in the
case of a franchise system set up to conduct a certain business under a com-
mon trademark or trade name, i.e., not necessarily to distribute the trade-
marked goods of the franchisor. Under such a type of franchise, the
trademark embodies the goodwill and quality standards of the enterprise and
is not directly used to identify the enterprise's products.116
Prior to the twentieth century, trademark law rested on the Source The-
ory of product recognition and relief was afforded based on a trademark's
value (as rooted in its use in commerce) by identifying the source of producer
116. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), abrogated by Rick-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters.,
532 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2008).
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goods and services in the marketplace.II7 In the early twentieth century,
propertization of trademarks came to the forefront and brought to light what
many were aware of but never acknowledged-in a complex marketplace,
where merchants sold goods manufactured by others, a merchant could own
a trademark on goods he did not manufacture.'I8 A merchant could sell prod-
ucts made by a wholly different manufacturer, "as frequently occurs today in
[the private brand] arrangements, but when he affixed his trademark to them
he signified that they met his standards of quality and that his business repu-
tation stood behind them."119 Under this system, trademarks were not only a
product identifier but also a symbol or guarantee of the quality and standards
employed by the mark owner. 20 This resulted in economic and legal accept-
ance that a trademark was valuable separate and apart from the products it
signified in commerce. 12' Namely, a trademark captured a business's good-
will,-in some instances, possibly even more than the trademark identified a
particular producer.
The acceptance of goodwill as part of the trademark package was possi-
bly inevitable. Nonetheless, it caused new frustrations because few could
precisely define goodwill, consistently signify it, or determine its valua-
tion.122 Still, its presence in the marketplace was universally recognized and
undeniable; goodwill or favor towards a brand is the intangible guide that
presupposes repeat purchases.123 It is the lifeblood of consumer loyalty. The
Supreme Court of Georgia wrote about goodwill's abstract nature in Smith v.
Davidson:
It is difficult to conceive of the good will of a business apart from
the tangible properties used in such business, or as a thing of form
and substance. It is more like a spirit that hovers over the physical,
a sort of atmosphere that surrounds the whole; the aroma that
springs from the conduct of the business; the favorable hue or re-
flection which the trade has become accustomed to associate with
117. GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.03[2], [11].
118. See id. at [11]; see, e.g. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888) (recognizing
trademark ownership of a merchant who sold flour purchased from a manufac-
turer; by placing his mark on the flour sold, he communicated that the flour met
his standards and conveyed uniform quality).
119. GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.03[l1].
120. Id.
121. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-88 (1999) ("[T]here has been a gradual but funda-
mental shift in trademark law. Commentators and even courts increasingly talk
about trademarks as property rights; as things valuable in and of themselves,
rather than for the product goodwill they embody.").
122. Smith v. Davidson, 31 S.E.2d 477, 480 (Ga. 1944).
123. GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.0314].
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a particular location, or under a certain name. As fragrance may
add loveliness to the flower from which it emanates, so good will
may add value to the physical from which it springs .... 124
Goodwill has developed into a business commodity apart from a producer's
ability to distinguish his mark in consumer awareness.125 A producer attempts
to control the distinctive use of his mark as a product identifier, but his good-
will rests in the hands of consumers and is a prize when it is received.126
Consumers do not make purchasing decisions simply because they can
distinguish a product from others. 127 In an option-filled market, consumers
make decisions based on product and brand favorability.28 Consumer recog-
nition of a trademark may "recall a previously-formed regard for the product
that is favorable, unfavorable[,] or neutral."129 These consumer impressions
"influence or even determine" the product selections of consumers. 30 Busi-
nesses stand to gain when they are able to communicate to the consuming
public the qualities and standards they have adopted.13, Ensuring a business's
image is accurately conveyed becomes a secondary effort to a consumer's
ability to identify a business's products, since consumer choice lends itself to
favorability over product distinction alone.132
Though the association of goodwill with a trademark is here to stay, it
has frustrated the governance of trademark law and the protections it affords.
Quality Theory cannot operate apart from Source Theory; a consumer must
first distinguish products before he can apply favorability.133 However,
Source Theory can function on its own without the need to decipher brands'
consumer favorability. 34 A trademark's ability to signify a producer's goods
and services remains intact regardless of whether consumers attach goodwill
to a brand's trademark.135 Consumers' awareness of a trademark does not
necessarily mean consumers have particular impressions of a certain brand,
but the trademark may still function to communicate what products are sold
by the brand. The Supreme Court has said:
124. Smith, 31 S.E.2d at 479-80.






131. GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.03[4].
132. Id.
133. See generally id. at § 1.03[2], [3].
134. See id. at § 1.03[2].
135. See id.
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There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection
with which the mark is employed .... [T]he fight to a particular
mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is
simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product
as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection
with an existing business.36
Expanding to account for the positive value a business's goodwill adds
to its trademark, the courts have offered several additional remedies for
trademark infringement, which have adjusted the scope of infringement from
"likelihood of confusion" to realms of misappropriation and unfair use. 137
2. Dilution: Remedial Expansion in Trademark Law
While Quality Theory gave unsure mark owners a means to conceptual-
ize property rights, it distorted trademark law's original recourse, use of a
mark likely to cause consumer confusion because the mark's value was no
longer solely in its ability to link consumers from product to brand.138 Now,
infringement has to also contemplate the goodwill a business might have
created.139 Trademark dilution arose as a variant of infringement.140 Courts
now protect trademark owners from uses formerly not considered to have
been infringements and have offered protections showing they view the
trademark as more than a product identifier.141 It is theorized that courts "are
well on their way to divorcing trademarks entirely from the goods they are
supposed to represent."42
As businesses grow and succeed in the marketplace, their marks gain
notoriety and even fame.143 These trademarks have developed a uniqueness
given the distinct and pervasive goodwill developed by the owners. 144 Trade-
mark dilution grew out of the proposition that any use of marks similar to
famous marks145 weakened the senior mark regardless of whether it actually
136. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
137. See Lemley, supra note 124, at 1697-98.
138. Id. at 1697.
139. See id. at 1701, 1709-10.
140. Id. at 1698-99.
141. Id. at 1700-01.
142. Id. at 1687-88.
143. See GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.03[4].
144. Id. at § 1.03[2], [4].
145. Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] plaintiff
must show that the senior mark possesses both a 'significant degree of inherent
distinctiveness' and, to qualify as famous, 'a high degree ... of acquired dis-
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caused consumer confusion.146 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act pro-
vided, "[T]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark."147 Departing from the traditional
foundation of trademark infringement, trademark dilution sidesteps the "like-
lihood of confusion" test and prohibits another's use of a similar mark not in
competition or connection with those of the famous mark owner.148
Specified by the federal statute, "federal dilution is actionable in two
situations: (1) dilution by 'blurring' and (2) dilution by 'tamishment."'149
Blurring occurs when the degree of similarity and use between famous and
secondary marks is strong enough that consumers could wrongfully associate
the marks together, thus, diminishing the distinctiveness of the famous
mark.150 Dilution by tarnishment is actionable when consumers perceive an
association between famous and secondary marks, potentially damaging the
reputation of the famous mark.151 Blurring and tarnishment are restricted by
forms of speech protected by fair use principles under the Lanham Act.52
Uses of famous marks are permitted in connection with advertising that en-
courages consumers to compare products or in connection with parody, cri-
tique, or commentary on the owner of the famous mark.153
3. Frustrations of Dilution (Goodwill Protection)
"[T]he requirement that the mark be 'famous' and 'distinctive' signifi-
cantly limits the pool of marks that may receive dilution protection,"]54 but
these "famous" mark owners often have the financial resources to use this
protection as a weapon by targeting brands that stand no chance of siphoning
the goodwill of the famous mark. Recently, in Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's
Borough Coffee, the Second Circuit rendered dilution claims slightly easier
tinctiveness."' (quoting TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d
88, 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2001)).
146. Id. at 448 ("The [Federal Trademark Dilution Act] permits the owner of a qual-
ified, famous mark to enjoin junior uses throughout commerce, regardless of
the absence of competition or confusion." (quoting TCPIP Holding Co., 244
F.3d at 95).
147. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 448 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006)).
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
149. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
150. Id. at 105-06.
151. Id. at 110.
152. Id. at 110-11.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
154. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 105 (citing Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 449).
[Vol. XVII
Trouble in Trademark Law
to win by asserting that "some-but not substantial-similarity between the
subject marks" was necessary to "demonstrate a likelihood of dilution."55
From the outset, trademark principles have been devised to tightly control the
monopolistic tenants of mark ownership. Even if the adoption and use of a
mark give it value and render it protectable, the letters, words, numbers, and
colors comprising the marks remain property of the public, free to adopt
them in distinct ways. The core of trademark law, resting on the "likelihood
of confusion" standard for infringement, left open the opportunity to use sim-
ilar marks so long as they were not caught in a market crossover.
The recognition that a trademark encompasses the goodwill of a busi-
ness incorporates the notion that a trademark's prominence is tied directly to
the business's longevity. It follows that protections specifically for goodwill
were created. Although dilution is an appropriate remedial measure for pro-
tecting a business's image and reputation, broad application by courts con-
flicts with the trademark objective to foster a free and open marketplace.
Faced with expensive litigation brought by a large company, regardless of
whether the claim claims likelihood of confusion or likelihood of dilution, a
small business is likely to trade in the mark at issue for one that is less troub-
lesome. The power and control this places in the hands of large businesses,
without checks and sanctions for unfounded lawsuits, permits forms of trade-
mark bullying.
4. The Internet and Initial Interest Confusion
Much like dilution, the theory of initial interest confusion developed as
a mechanism to provide a remedy to mark owners whose marks were used by
unauthorized third parties to capture a consumer's interest and trade on the
goodwill of the trademark. Following the development and proliferation of
the Internet, this theory of confusion has been used with increasing fre-
quency, and it is seen most often in the context of domain name disputes,
metatag use, and keyword advertising. However, the doctrine has developed
inconsistently, with no definitive test and no certainty as to the factors that a
court will consider in deciding initial interest confusion cases.
In the early development of online trademark litigation, which dealt pri-
marily with domain names, many courts were reluctant to extend trademark
to scenarios where there was no likelihood of confusion.56 Indeed, the con-
sensus at the time was simple: trademark uses must be analyzed according to
the traditional likelihood of confusion factors when determining infringement
online.157 Evaluating evidence of actual confusion, the district court in CD
155. Id. at 107 n.3.
156. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331,
1336-37 (D. Ore. 1997), rev'd, 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).
157. See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623-24
(6th Cir. 1998); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co.,
977 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Interstellar, 983 F. Supp. at 1335.
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Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker wrote, "While an Internet user seeking to purchase a
product of defendants may go initially to the plaintiff's website, it is unlikely
that an actual or prospective customer of defendants would be confused in its
purchasing decision . . . ."158 As Internet usage increased and technology
advanced, many courts became concerned and could not fathom that the use
of a trademark in a domain name did not give rise to an actionable claim
under trademark law. The shift in attitude of the courts toward infringement
online began the great migration from a requirement of a thorough "likeli-
hood of confusion" inquiry to opinions, which seem to be solely concerned
with the goodwill associated with the mark. Indeed, this abandonment of a
likelihood of confusion requirement for infringement on the Internet created
a split within and among circuits.159 Ultimately, courts began to advance the
doctrine to find liability for perceived bad acts without engaging in any anal-
ysis, concluding the existence of initial interest confusion and therefore in-
fringement.160 As noted by Notre Dame law professor Mark McKenna,
trademark owners have become increasingly astute at equating any use of a
trademark as causing confusion (and therefore infringement) and capitalizing
on the generalization of confusion as harm.161 McKenna is certainly correct
that, under modern trademark law, confusion is too often equated to harm
and has created the excess that one sees in trademark confusion doctrine.
5. The Reality of the Internet Troika
Imagine for a moment that you are in the market for a tablet computer.
While you are not necessarily interested in purchasing an iPad, it is the only
thing you can conjure up for your Internet search to describe the type of
product for which you are searching. You go to Google, rather than searching
for "tablet computers," you type in the search term "iPad." If the search en-
158. CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 15 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (D. Ore. 1998).
159. Compare PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., 319 F.3d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the touchstone of liability is whether the defendant's use of a
disputed mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers regarding the ori-
gin of the goods offered), and Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found for Apolo-
getic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1055 (10th Cir. 2008) (implying that
confusion is necessary to show a likelihood of confusion, but it is the "best
evidence of a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace"), with Brookfield
Communs. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the difficulties in gathering evidence of actual confusion make its
absence generally unnoteworthy), and Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d
439, 448 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the owner of a qualified, famous mark
may enjoin junior uses throughout commerce, regardless of the absence of
confusion).
160. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 779-80 (2004).
161. Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modem Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95
IOWA L. REV. 63, 67 (2009).
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gine returns results for the Samsung Galaxy Note, according to the "Internet
troika" (described below) Samsung has committed trademark infringement.
Liability attaches, notwithstanding the facts that you are not interested in
purchasing a particular make or model of tablet, you are clearly aware that
Samsung and Apple market competing products, and there is no confusion as
to the source. The Internet troika originated with the Ninth Circuit in Brook-
field Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. and has been used
as the benchmark for countless decisions involving initial interest confusion
online.162 That "troika" of "(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness
of goods or services, and, (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing
channel,"163 has been cited and used by courts extensively in decisions due to
their viewing the unauthorized use of trademarks online as inherently creat-
ing harm to the goodwill of the brand. Indeed, trademark owners in their
policing policies have used this same rationale. Use by a third party of a
similar mark is bound to lead to confusion, and this encourages owners to
protect their marks with active enforcement even in the absence of any true
likelihood of confusion. After over a decade, the Ninth Circuit abandoned the
troika and writing for the court in Network Automation v. Advanced Systems
Concepts, Judge Wardlaw stated that the court "did not intend Brookfield to
be read so expansively as to forever enshrine these three factors-now often
referred to as the 'Internet trinity' or 'Internet troika'-as the test for trade-
mark infringement on the Internet."164 Recognizing the error that arose from
reliance on the Internet troika, the court abandoned the limiting view, writing
that "[g]iven the multifaceted nature of the Internet and the ever-expanding
ways in which we all use the technology .... it makes no sense to prioritize
the same three factors for every type of potential online commercial activ-
ity."165 There is no doubt that courts that handle trademark cases, like those
from the Ninth Circuit, need to evaluate their policies of policing and deter-
mine when policing evolves into bullying.
IV. TRADEMARK POLICING VERSUS
TRADEMARK BULLYING
For the trademark system to maintain its core functionality, trademark
owners must be fervent in protecting their marks. A valid trademark is not
something that just materializes into being. It is an investment chosen by a
producer, who in turn nurtures it into an effective device for communicating
162. See generally Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (cited by 531 federal cases before court in Network Auto-
mation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011)
declined to extend).
163. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148 (referencing the Brookfield court's em-
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brand and product information. Rapid growth and expansion of trademark
law have placed a lot of weight on trademark owners' shoulders. Trademarks
first developed as a means to designate the source or origin of a particular
product or service in order to distinguish products and services from one
another, but trademarks have since grown to denote standards of quality,
symbolic of goodwill, which guide consumer purchases and loyalty.166 Own-
ers invest time and money into building business symbols and deserve the
right to protect them.
Doctrinal pressures also exist to encourage diligence in trademark pro-
tection. The doctrine of laches, a long established concept, forbids a mark
owner to assert his trademark rights over a secondary user when in the past
the mark owner has not consistently or appropriately asserted.
"Laches is an equitable time limitation on a party's right to bring
suit, . . . resting on the maxim that one who seeks the help of a court of
equity must not sleep on his rights."167 The party asserting laches must show
"(1) [the plaintiff's delay] in filing suit was unreasonable, and (2) [it] would
suffer prejudice caused by the delay if the suit were to continue."168
Now a mark owner must rebut the underlying presumption of laches to
recover from another who uses improper mark policing as a defense; this
limits the relief available in infringement lawsuits.169 Laches presumes that
an owner who makes little, inconsistent, or no effort to assert trademark
rights perceives no value in his mark and, thus, acquiesces to its unfettered
use. Application of laches is highly circumstantial, "not determined by sim-
ple rules of thumb or rigid legal rules ... [but] by a consideration of circum-
stances of each particular case . ."170 Knowing the highly circumstantial
nature of the application of laches, the motivation to assert superiority over
other mark uses becomes clear. Failing to stand against one's confusing use
may lead to preclusion from future threats and limit options for relief.
However, where laches motivate mark owners to police their marks, it
also gives legitimacy to trademark bullies. Courts expect businesses to dili-
gently police their marks in order to expect remedies against alleged infringe-
ment, but remain rather tight-lipped on when an owner's mark policing has
166. GILSON, supra note 25, at § 1.03[4].
167. Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (quoting Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d
829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotations omitted).
168. Id. at 1108-09 (quoting Jarrow Formulas, 304 F.3d at 838).
169. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877) ("[I]t is sufficient to give the
injured party a right to redress, if he has been guilty of no laches."), superseded
by statute as recognized in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159
(1995).
170. Saul Zaentz, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotations
omitted).
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become excessive. Courts have yet to truly explore the realm of sanctioning
unwarranted lawsuits initiated by those plaintiffs who look to assert an exces-
sive degree of control by use of their financial strength. This is largely be-
cause such cases rarely make it to court and thus demonstrates how these
trademark bullies have been successful in their bullying efforts. The adminis-
trative costs of enforcing trademark litigation, like litigation in general, are
often determinative of which conflicts make it before a court. It is a market-
place reality that many small businesses simply do not have the financial
means to stand their ground. Weighing against two evils, it is likely more
efficient for a secondary mark user to surrender his rights in the mark, de-
spite the expense invested developing it, in order to avoid the expense of
litigating in court. Though this is a construct of a marketplace where entities
earning large- and small-scale profits coexist, the developing problem of
trademark bullying hinders the anti-monopolistic constraints of trademark
law.
V. CONCLUSION
Now more than ever, there is need for judicial recognition of when a
mark owner has crossed the line in policing his mark past valid protection
and into a realm of hindering competition or fostering monopoly. A con-
certed delineation on the boundaries of mark protection policies, within the
context of the policies' effects on smaller businesses, will level the competi-
tive playing field and more closely align trademark practice with its original
intentions. Trademark law frequently sees surrender to the stronger party;
larger businesses are striking down smaller businesses who attempt to use
marks that are similar, yet unlikely to cause consumer confusion. Are con-
sumers likely to believe that George Lucas, who has been a leader in fantasy
film and computer graphic design, suddenly opted to get into the niche mar-
ket of Internet-based ad design? More importantly, are consumers even
aware that "droid" signified Lucas-owned products? Not likely so. Consumer
understanding would also likely reject the belief that Mark Zuckerberg and
Facebook decided to provide educator lesson plans or that Chik-fil-A decided
to bring kale to the forefront of its menu.
What should be the resolution to this growing form of abuse? The an-
swer does not lie in deconstructing the settled world of trademark law. An
owner has a valid interest in his mark's position, and what it signifies and
communicates to consumers in the marketplace. Courts have always recog-
nized the use of trademarks as a tool for protecting producers and business
owners but not as a tool meant for control and monopolistic creation. The
trademark has seen its own expansion through the historical development of
American and foreign free-market economies. A touch of irony exists in the
fact that some mark owners are using the system against itself. Courts must
now address this important matter and begin to impose sanctions for exces-
sive policing, where claims of superior over secondary marks are superficial
or speculative. The doctrine of laches, as a form of estoppel, prevents incon-
sistent assertion of mark rights, but certainly does not encourage wanton at-
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tacks against less powerful mark users. Ownership of a trademark does not
equate to monopoly over that mark, which is emphasized by the "likelihood
of confusion" standard for infringement. However, with expansions and new
accommodations introduced into the trademark realm, courts are dealing with
an evolving being. Courts must make a concerted effort to come together and
consider the effect interpretations and standards have upon the commercial
population, not just those who they consistently see before their bench.
